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‘OUGHT’ AND CONTROL* 
 
Matthew Chrisman 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract: Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an 
obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-
sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response 
is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who 
classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as 
operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to 
elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The 
thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least has two senses, one implicating agency and 
connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some 
resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the 
meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically 
sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and 
non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false 
claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences – or so I attempt to show by first situating 
Schroder’s argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic 
evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some 
more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists 
might be refined in light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and 
non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more 
careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Ethical theorists are interested in the meaning of the word ‘ought’ largely because the 
paradigmatic way in English to state general moral principles as well as specific practical 
conclusions is with an ought-sentence. For example, Kant’s initial statement of the 
Categorical Imperative reads: ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will 
that my maxim should become a universal law’ [1785/1985: 402].1 And one of the most 
                                                
* I appreciate support for research on this article provided by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. I 
would also like to thank John Broome, Davide Fassio, Stephen Finlay, Mark Schroeder, Alex Silk and a referee 
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1 This is Ellington’s translation. In the original German, Kant uses ‘sollen’, which is etymologically related to 
the English word ‘should’. For my purposes here, I will be ignoring any distinction between ‘should’ and 
‘ought’. 
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famous claims of applied ethics is Singer’s contention that ‘we ought, morally, to be working 
full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other 
disasters’ [1972: 238]. Although we can state ethical principles and conclusions in other 
ways, I think it is no mistake that we often reach for ‘ought’ to do so. But what does ‘ought’ 
mean? 
Ethical theorists often seem to assume tacitly what Singer makes explicit in writing, 
‘‘I have an obligation to’ means no more, and no less, than ‘I ought to’’ [ibid.: 233]. This 
assumption is belied, however, by the diversity of ought-claims in ordinary English. In 
addition to moral ‘ought’s like the ones mentioned above, we also say things like 
PRUDENTIAL: Bob ought to give up smoking (for his personal wellbeing). 
TELEOLOGICAL: One ought to use anchor bolts (in order to support a loft bed). 
BOULETIC: Jean ought to come too (as my husband would like it). 
EVALUATIVE: Milton, you ought to be alive at this hour (as England needs you).2 
EPISTEMIC: The storm ought to hit shore before midnight (given its speed).  
I doubt any of these are plausibly interpreted in terms of obligations, but surely not all of 
them are. 
Ethical theorists tend to respond to this diversity by suggesting (or, more often, tacitly 
assuming) that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. For instance, Harman writes ‘One would intuitively 
distinguish at least four senses of the word ought…’ [1973: 235]. And I think most ethical 
theorists would agree with him that it is important to distinguish the ethical and prudential 
senses of ‘ought’ from the other apparently non-practical senses of ‘ought’. The basic idea is 
that these ‘ought’s are the ones relevant to the projects of moral philosophy, metaethics and 
deontic logic. The meaning, truth and implication of all of the others can be ignored or at 
least put off to a later stage in our theorizing. I suspect there is a kernel of truth in this idea, 
but as a linguistic thesis it is implausible that ‘ought’ is multiply ambiguous.  
Now, when philosophers and linguists suggest that a word is has multiple senses or is 
‘ambiguous’, it is not always clear what they mean or that they mean the same thing; 
moreover, a sentence can admit of multiple reasonable interpretations or be ‘ambiguous’ even 
though none of its words are, since its unarticulated constituents may differ. What I mean 
when I say that it is linguistically implausible that the word ‘ought’ is multiply ambiguous is 
not merely that it is not a homonym.3 Rather I mean that it is linguistically implausible that 
there are multiple semantic rules for the verb ‘ought’ implicit in the linguistic competence of 
ordinary speakers. I take it that one of the core projects of semantic theory is to articulate 
such rules. In my view, a much more plausible hypothesis is that there is a single semantic 
rule for ‘ought’, which by reference to constituents which often go unarticulated in ought-
sentences, can generate multiple reasonable interpretations and the various ‘flavours’ of 
ought-sentences illustrated above. This view is by no means novel to me. It is borne out by 
the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by both lexicographers and theoretical semanticists, but, as 
we shall see, some philosophers deny it. 
In any case, I think most linguists would agree that we should not posit four or five 
(or more) distinct entries for ‘ought’ in the English lexicon, on pain of making it mysterious 
                                                
2 This is a modernization of a line in Wordsworth’s poem England, 1802, which is discussed also by Wedgwood 
[2007]. It has been called ‘evaluative’ because it seems to say that some, alas impossible situation, would be 
good. In this way it is like saying it ‘It ought not to have happened’ about a natural disaster which killed many 
people. 
3 Indeed the use of ‘ought’ as an antiquated variant of ‘naught’ is a homonym of the various uses of the modal 
verb ‘ought’ which are at issue in this paper, but that is irrelevant. 
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how language learners master their uses. Moreover, most of the different ‘senses’ of ‘ought’ 
appear to be systematically manifested in other languages and in other words in the system of 
English modals. This is why the orthodox view in theoretical semantics is that ‘ought’ is 
monosemous operator (akin to deontic necessity) but semantically underdetermined, such that 
its uses require significant contextual augmentation to determine a definite sense.4 
This orthodoxy neatly explains the diverse flavours of ought-sentences mentioned 
above. There are various important details to be worked out, but the basic idea is to gloss all 
ought-sentences in terms of it being somehow necessary that some proposition is true. For 
instance, Kant’s statement of the categorical imperative might be glossed as saying that it is 
morally necessary – i.e. necessary in light of the laws of morality – that I act in such a way 
that I could also will that my maxim become universal law. This is easy to contrast with the 
prudential ought-statement above, which might be glossed as saying that it is prudentially 
necessary – i.e. necessary for a particular person’s life to go best all things considered – that 
Bob give up smoking. Likewise with the bouletic ought-statement above, which might be 
glossed as saying that it is bouletically necessary – i.e. necessary in order to fully satisfy 
some assumed preference set – that Jean come too. And this even seems to work to a first 
approximation for the epistemic ought-statement above, which might be glossed as saying 
that it is epistemically necessary – i.e. necessary to believe in light of standards of good belief 
formation, some evidence about the storm’s speed and an assumption about things going as 
they usually do – that the storm will hit shore before midnight.5 And so on, for any ought-
statement. 
In spite of the unity of this proposal and its popularity among theoretical semanticists, 
there is a pervasive view in among philosophers who have considered the question that the 
core or most important use of ‘ought’ is to say what some agent ought to do and not what 
proposition ought to be true. The thought is that it is only the former which expresses the 
specifically practical relation holding between agents and actions that is relevant to ethics. 
Prichard expresses this sentiment most baldly, writing: ‘The word ‘ought’ refers to actions 
and to actions alone. The proper language is never ‘So and so ought to be’, but ‘I ought to do 
so and so’’ [1912: 24].  
If this is meant as a description of English, I think the examples given above clearly 
show it to be wrong. However, several philosophers have suggested, in a more nuanced way, 
that there might be two distinct senses of ‘ought’: the ‘agential’ sense and the ‘non-agential’ 
sense.6 The idea is that the former involves someone’s agency and is related to practical 
                                                
4 Although she doesn’t focus on ‘ought’, the canonical sources in formal semantics for this kind of view are 
Kratzer [1977, 1981, 1991]. 
5 Like I said, there are various important details to be worked out, especially capturing the apparent distinction 
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ and developing an adequate model-theory for perspicuous representation of the 
formal structure of arbitrary ought-sentences. The former challenge is illustrated most baldly in the epistemic 
case, where to get a plausible necessity-analysis one has to deploy an assumption about things going as they 
usually do. Working out the precise way to do this takes some care. Compare McNamara [1996a, 1996b], Ninan 
[2005], Von Fintel and Iatridou [2008], Portner [2009: 79-82], Finlay [2010], and Chrisman and Ridge 
[unpublished] for more discussion of this issue. The latter challenge is illustrated in attempts to get the 
entailment relations between ought-sentences to come out intuitively correctly. The literature here is vast, but 
for some recently important discussion see Dreier [2009], Finlay [2010], Kolodny and Macfarlane [2010], 
Björnsson and Finlay [2010], Cariani [forthcoming], and Dowell [unpublished]. The important point here is that 
these details motivate elaborations and refinements of the monosemy view about the semantic contribution of 
‘ought’ rather than a posit of multiple semantic rules or distinct lexical entries for the word. 
6 Compare Sidgwick’s [1874/1907: 33] discussion of the ‘political’ ‘ought’ as distinct from the agentive ‘ought’ 
of ethics, Moore’s [1903: §90] distinction between statements of what ought to be and what we ought to do, 
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deliberations and obligations; it is the sense of ‘ought’ which implies the ‘can’ having to do 
with the kind of control we have over our own actions. The latter is something else. 
Perhaps, if this is a linguistically defensible claim, the projects of ethical theory can 
proceed by focusing on the agential sense of ‘ought’ and mostly ignoring the non-agential 
sense(s). That is, normative ethicists can go on assuming, without too much offense to 
ordinary language, that (agential) ‘ought’ is intimately tied to obligation and practical 
reasons. Moral psychologists can go on assuming that (agential) ought-claims are 
interestingly practical in a sense that animates competing articulations of ethical internalism 
and externalism, as well as the debate between Humeans and anti-Humeans about motivation. 
Metaethicists can go on debating the existence, nature and epistemology of the special ethical 
relation purportedly represented by an (agential) ought-claim. And deontic logicians, well, 
they might have to give up locating their subject as a species of modal logic; but, if Geach 
[1982] is right, this may be just the cure for most of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic. 
But is it really linguistically defensible to claim that ‘ought’ is ambiguous between 
agential and non-agential senses? I think many linguists looking at the whole family of modal 
verbs in English, as well as cognates in other languages, would find this suggestion too 
particular to ‘ought’ and motivated by philosophical considerations exogenous to the 
systematic aspirations of semantic theory to take seriously. However, Schroeder [2011] has 
recently offered a philosophically and linguistically sophisticated attempt to defend the 
suggestion that there are agential and non-agential senses of the word ‘ought’.7  
In this paper, I want to argue that, despite what it teaches us, his attempt fails. That is 
not because I doubt the importance of the agential/non-agential distinction for ethical theory. 
But I do doubt that viewing this distinction as manifested semantically as a subtle ambiguity 
in the word ‘ought’ brings us closer to the goals of both ethical and semantic theory with 
respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. Rather, in my view, this distinction presents a challenge 
from ethical theory that a more orthodox monosemy view in semantic theory will, with some 
refinements, meet. In this context, I think the failure of Schroeder’s argument provides a 
good forum to draw some lessons for both ethical and semantic theory. 
 
 
2. Linguistic Background 
 
I start not with Schroeder’s argument but some background in the semantics of English 
modals and the syntax of subject control, which is helpful for understanding and evaluating 
his argument. In theoretical semantics and linguistic typology, modal words like ‘must’, 
                                                
Castañeda’s [1963] non-standard deontic logic for ‘ought-to-do’s, Sellars’ [1969] distinction between ‘rules of 
criticism’ and ‘rules of action’, Humberstone’s [1971] discussion of the ‘agent-involving’ sense of ‘ought’, B. 
Williams’ [1981] discussion of ‘deliberative’ and ‘non-deliberative’ ‘ought’s, and Feldman’s [1986] discussion 
of ‘ought-to-be’ vs ‘ought-to-do’. Clearly, the terminology here is not uniform, and some of this terminology 
can be misleading. Here, I mostly use the terminology ‘agential’ vs ’non-agential’, but when I discuss 
Schroeder’s [2011] argument below, I follow him in using B. Williams’ term ‘deliberative’ as a cognate of 
‘agential’. 
7 Compare also Harman [1973: 235-36, 1975: 3-13]. An influential early response to Harman is B. Williams 
[1981], though his response seems to me to be fallacious in ways pointed out by Lee [1987] and Broome 
[forthcoming]. In a linguistic context, Brennan [1993: §2.1-2.2] has also defended a view very similar to 
Schroeder’s, and Portner [2009: 188] suggests briefly that something like it might be true, although I believe 
both of them would draw different conclusions about what this means for the orthodox view in linguistics of the 
semantics of modal verbs.  
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‘may’ and ‘ought’ are typically divided into their epistemic uses and their root uses.8 The 
former have to do with the strength of evidence for a proposition, whereas the latter have to 
do with duties, values and practical reasons. For instance, the first sentence of each of the 
following pairs is naturally given an epistemic interpretation, whereas the second is naturally 
given a root interpretation: 
(1) a. The ground is soaked, it must have rained hard.  
  b. If you want to get there in an hour, you must fly.  
(2) a. She may have the disease but not be showing symptoms.  
  b. You may stay out till 11 o’clock, but no later.  
 (3) a. If they left an hour ago, they ought to be home by now.  
  b.  We ought to do more for the poor and for the deranged.  
Because of this distinction, sometimes a single sentence admits of two plausible 
interpretations. For example, each of the following sentences admit of both epistemic and 
root interpretations: 
 (4) a. Tara must help James with his work 
   …otherwise it is inexplicable how he manages to do it. 
   …the regulations require it. 
  b. Tara may help James with his work 
 …that’s one possible explanation of how he finishes so quickly. 
   …but not so much that he gains an unfair advantage. 
  c. Tara ought to help James with his work 
   …since she’s usually around to pitch in. 
   …since she promised.    
An old and bold suggestion in theoretical linguistics is that we can distinguish 
epistemic and root interpretations of these sentences syntactically. For instance Ross [1969: 
87-88] and Perlmutter [1970: 115] suggest that epistemic modals evoke raising-verb 
structure, while root modal evoke control-verb structure.9 Both raising verbs and control 
verbs can occur as the head verb in sentences or clauses with a subordinate non-finite verb 
that has no explicit subject. For example,  
(5) a.  Tara seemed to help James with his work. 
b. Tara tried to help James with his work. 
are paradigmatic examples of, respectively, raising-verb and control-verb structures. In both 
cases, the head verb (‘seemed’ or ‘tried’) is followed by a subordinate non-finite verb (‘help’) 
that has no explicit subject. However, these sentences differ syntactically in an important 
way.  
                                                
8 Although I think Portner [2009: 135] is right to reject the umbrella category of root modals in favor of a more 
fine-grained distinction that treats deontic, teleological, and bouletic modals as species of priority modals, 
which he then contrasts with both epistemic modals and dynamic modals, here I shall follow standard practice in 
linguistics of using the term root to refer to non-epistemic modals. This causes no confusion in the present 
context since ‘must’, ‘may’, and ‘ought’ do not appear ever to function as dynamic modals. This means that for 
them the traditional epistemic-root distinction comes to the same thing as Portner’s epistemic-priority 
distinction. 
9 Since they came first, I am going to call this ‘Ross and Perlmutter’s thesis’, but the view has been defended in 
more detail by Jackendoff [1972], Zubizarreta [1982], Roberts [1985], and E. Williams [1985]. See also 
Newmeyer [1975: 27-34], Bhatt [1998], Wurmbrand [1999], and Fukuda [2007] for further critical discussion 
beyond the little bit that follows here. 
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In (5a), the verb ‘seemed’ does not semantically require an external argument for a 
subject.10 This means that we might represent its meaning as something like 
SEEMED [Tara helped James with his work]proposition 
However, the syntactic rules of English require every sentence to have a subject. In this case, 
the name ‘Tara’ does that job. By contrast, in (5b), the verb ‘tried’ does semantically require 
an external argument for a subject. Nothing is tried unless there is someone or something 
who is trying. In this case it is Tara who is the trier. Hence, we might represent its meaning as 
something like 
[Tara]agent TRIED [PROagent helps James with his work]action-description 
It is this kind of difference between (5a) and (5b) that motivates the distinction between 
raising-verb syntax and control-verb syntax. A raising-verb syntax is one where the subject 
can be thought of as ‘raised’ from its position as the subject of the subordinate verb to serve 
as the subject of the whole sentence or clause. For example, in (5a), we can think of the 
subject ‘Tara’ as syntactically raised from the subject of ‘to help’ to be the subject of the 
whole sentence. A control-verb syntax, in contrast, is one where the subject semantically 
‘controls’ both the main verb and the subordinate verb. For example, in (5b), the subject 
‘Tara’ can be thought of as the controller of both verbs in the sentence.11 
One test that is widely thought to be probative of this distinction has to do with the 
sorts of restrictions that a verb puts on what can be its syntactic subject without anomaly. The 
syntactic subject of a raising verb is not restricted for any particular thematic role. For 
example, it is fine to ‘lower’ the raised subject in (5a) by replacing it with the explicative ‘it’, 
as in ‘It seemed that Tara helped James with his work.’ The verb ‘seem’ can also take 
subjects without restriction on thematic role. For example, we can use a sentential subject as 
in ‘That she helped him with his work seemed to please James’; and we can use an idiomatic 
or nonagentive subject with a raising verb as in ‘All hell seemed to break loose.’ These 
features are characteristic of raising-verb structures since the raised subject is not, so to 
speak, the real (semantic) subject of the verb, but only a syntactic stand-in forced on us by 
English syntax. By contrast, the verb ‘try’ semantically restricts its subject to something with 
the thematic role of an agent (i.e. something that can cogently be thought of as the one who 
tries). This is why we cannot legitimately use an explicative subject as in ‘It tried that Tara 
helped James with his work’, or a sentential subject as in ‘That she helped him with his work 
tried to please Tara’, or an idiomatic or nonagentive subject as in ‘All hell tried to break 
loose.’ These features are characteristic of control-verb structures since the controlling 
subject is, so to speak, the real (semantic) subject of the verb. 
In light this distinction between raising and control structures, Ross and Perlmutter’s 
hypothesis can be put as follows. Unlike the verbs ‘seems’ and ‘tries’, which evoke only one 
syntactic structure, modal verbs like ‘must’, ‘may’ and ‘ought’ can evoke either raising or 
control syntax; and the difference between epistemic and root readings lines up with the 
difference between raising and control syntaxes. This is why, the sentences in (6) are most 
naturally given epistemic rather than root interpretations: 
 (6) a. It must be the case that Tara helps James with his work. 
  b. James may be helped with his work by Tara. 
                                                
10 It may require an external argument for the person to whom it seemed that Tara helped James with his work. 
This is irrelevant to my argument here and I will suppress this complication in what follows. 
11 The general issue of verb control in theoretical syntax is much more complicated than the initial distinction 
between raising and control verbs that I will discuss here. These complications are not relevant here, but I 
encourage the reader to consult Landau [2000: 1-24] for a more general introduction. 
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  c.  That Tara is present ought to help James with his work. 
The more general suggestion is that this is why sentences that force raising structure 
interpretations are most plausibly given epistemic rather than root interpretations. 
This is an elegant hypothesis, but it is important in the present context to understand 
why it is not at all credible. There are clear cases where a modal in a raising structure 
deserves a root interpretation, e.g.:  
(7) a.  There must be no punching below the belt, and no throttling. 
b. There may be beer and cider at the party, but I refuse to permit spirits 
in the house.12 
c. There ought to be more salt in this soup; it tastes bland. 
These are raising structures because they deploy the explicative subject ‘there’, but they 
deserve root interpretations because they have to do with duties, values and practical reasons 
rather than strength of evidence. Also consider the following sentences, which deploy a 
sentential subject and embed ‘ought’ in an idiomatic construction: 
(8) a. That she helped him with his work ought to please James. 
b. If Tara doesn’t help James with his work, all hell ought to break loose. 
We can get a root interpretation of (8a) if it is said in a context where it is common ground 
that James is generally culpably ungrateful for Tara’s generous help. Similarly, we can get a 
root interpretation of (8b) if it is said in a context where it is common ground that James has 
silently acquiesced time and time again as Tara has neglected helping him in even the most 
trivial ways. 
I bring up this relatively old and settled debate about whether the epistemic/root 
distinction in modal semantics lines up with the raising/control distinction in verb syntax 
because Schroeder’s argument that ‘ought’ is subtly ambiguous turns on the claim that it 
evokes control syntax in some uses but raising syntax in others. Rather than seeking to line 
this up with the root/epistemic distinction, as Ross and Perlmutter did, Schroeder seeks to 
line it up with the agential/non-agential distinction I mentioned above. This saves him from 
the obvious counterexamples, but I still think his claim is highly dubious, as I shall argue in 
the following two sections. 
 
 
3. ‘Deliberative’ ‘Ought’s and Control 
 
Following B. Williams [1981], Schroeder refers to the distinctive sense of ‘ought’ he believes 
to be involved in agential ought-statements as the deliberative ‘ought’; and he suggests five 
‘hallmarks of deliberative ‘ought’s’ [2011: 9-10]: (i) they matter directly for advice in the 
sense that knowing what someone ought to do is knowing is knowing what is advisable for 
them to do, (ii) they close practical deliberation in the sense that knowing what one ought to 
do is settling the question of what to do,13 (iii) they are closely related to the notion of 
accountability, (iv) they, unlike other ought-statements, support the principle that ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’, and (v) they are closely related to the notion of obligation. 
                                                
12 Sentences (7a) and (7b) are from Pullum and Wilson [1977: 784]. They cite Newmeyer [1975] and Lakoff 
[1972] as giving similar examples and further evidence for interpreting ‘virtually all’ the modals with raising 
syntax – whether or not they are associated with epistemic or root readings. See also Brennan [1993], Warner 
[1993: 16], and Wurmbrand [1999] for further arguments against assimilating the epistemic-root distinction to 
the raising-control structure distinction. 
13 According to Schroeder, the qualification ‘directly’ and the idea of ‘closing’ deliberation are important, as 
many non-deliberative ‘ought’s are indirectly relevant for advice and factor somehow in practical deliberation. 
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 He then argues that the distinction between all of the ‘ought’s that do bear these 
features and those that do not can be explained in terms of the distinction between control 
and raising syntax. One reason he thinks this is a promising hypothesis is that, in addition to 
the restriction on thematic-role of the subject mentioned above, another test generally thought 
to be probative of the raising/control distinction is that sentences evoking raising verb 
structure admit of active/passive synonymy, whereas sentences evoking control verb 
structures do not. For example, with a paradigmatic raising verb like ‘seems’, we appear to 
get active/passive synonymy: 
 (9) a. Bill seemed to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Lucy seemed to be kissed by Bill. 
The same is not true of a paradigmatic control verb like ‘tries’: 
 (10) a. Bill tried to kiss Lucy. 
  b.  Lucy tried to be kissed by Bill. 
Intuitively, this is because raising verbs operate on a proposition, which could be expressed 
in the active or passive voice, while control verbs relate a thematic-role restricted subject to a 
complement. 
 Schroeder’s idea is that we can use this test to show how deliberative ‘ought’s evoke 
control structure while all of the other ‘ought’s evoke raising structure. Consider his leading 
example: 
(11) a.  Bill ought to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Lucy ought to be kissed by Bill. 
To get the difference he is after, imagine that we are discussing Bill’s infatuation with Lucy 
and we think that his kissing her is the thing for him to do at this moment in their evolving 
courtship. In such a case, the ‘ought’ in (11a) can seem to relate Bill to the action we would 
advise him to undertake: to kiss Lucy. More generally, it seems to bear the hallmarks of the 
deliberative ‘ought’. By contrast, Schroeder thinks (11b) is never plausibly interpreted as 
bearing the hallmarks of the deliberative ‘ought’. That does not mean it involves an epistemic 
‘ought’. Perhaps there are contexts in which this ought-sentence could be epistemic, but we 
might also say (11b) in a context where we think it would be somehow ideal or would satisfy 
someone’s preferences if Lucy were kissed by Bill, but we would not presume to advise him 
to do so or hold him accountable. Imagine for instance that we are Lucy’s older relatives and 
we think Lucy’s being kissed by Bill would be a risk free way to scare off undesirable 
suitors. In such a case, the ‘ought’ in (11b) can seem merely to evaluate the desirability of 
some state of affairs, and so not to be synonymous with (11a) on the deliberative 
interpretation. Schroeder’s suggestion is that this non-synonymy between (11a) and (11b) is 
best explained by positing different syntactic structures evoked by the verb ‘ought’: raising vs 
control. 
On Schroeder’s view, the situation here is complicated by the fact that (11a) can also 
be used non-deliberatively. That is, it could be substituted with (11b) in the types of contexts 
where (11b) is appropriate. Then, however, Schroder argues it should be not be understood as 
deploying the deliberative ‘ought’ and it can be assigned raising syntax rather than control 
syntax. He writes, ‘When I say that ‘ought’ is ‘ambiguous’ between these two ‘senses’, I just 
mean this: even when we exclude ‘epistemic’ readings, the word ‘ought’ sometimes exhibits 
raising syntax, and sometimes exhibits control syntax, and its semantic significance is 
different in each of these cases – each of the hallmarks of the deliberative ‘ought’ is exhibited 
in all and only the cases exhibiting control syntax’ [ibid.: 18]. 
 9 
 Despite its obvious similarity to Ross and Perlmutter’s thesis discussed above, 
Schroeder’s view differs in two important respects. First, it is focused on the word ‘ought’ 
(he does not mention other modals like ‘must’ and ‘may’ in his paper). Second, as I already 
mentioned, it is not an attempt to distinguish a root sense of ‘ought’ from an epistemic sense 
of ‘ought’ but rather an attempt to distinguish the deliberative sense of ‘ought’ from all of the 
others (including epistemic ‘ought’s and evaluative ‘ought’s). However, he claims that if his 
view is correct it presents a serious challenge to the orthodoxy in theoretical semantics, which 
(as we’ve seen) treats ‘ought as a monosemous operator akin to more familiar sorts of 
necessity modals. That is, Schroeder contends that this orthodoxy needs to be rethought 
insofar as it entails that there is, ‘no argument-place for an agent in any relation expressed by 
‘ought’, nor is there any argument-place for an action’ [ibid.: 2].14 His argument is that the 
deliberative ‘ought’ evokes control-verb syntax and so should be viewed as expressing a 
relation between agents and actions rather than effecting a modal operation. Because of this, 
he thinks ‘ought’ is ambiguous, since he agrees that all of the other ‘ought’s evoke raising 
verb syntax and so can be plausibly interpreted as a kind of modal operator. 
 
 
4. Why this is Wrong 
 
Although Schroeder’s view does not face the obvious counterexamples undermining Ross 
and Perlmutter’s thesis, there are examples similar to those that I believe muddy the water 
enough to call into doubt Schroeder’s claim that the ‘hallmarks of the deliberative ‘ought’’ 
pick out special sense of the word distinguished by the syntactic structure it evokes.  
Consider the first hallmark having to do with advice. I think Schroeder is right that we 
often track an intuitive contrast between ought-claims used to evaluate the desirability of a 
situation and ought-claims used to give advice. Clearly, sentences like (12a) play a different 
sort of role from sentences like (12b): 
(12) a. Larry ought to win the lottery (as he has had the fate of Job recently). 
b. Larry ought to spend his money on food (rather than lottery tickets). 
However, if Schroeder is right that this is because the former evokes raising structure while 
the latter evokes control structure, then we should expect other ‘ought’s of advice to put 
thematic-role restrictions on their subjects as well – after all, that is one of the signature 
features of control verbs. But there are apparent counterexamples: 
 (13) a. Invitations ought to go out by post. (Wedding Advice) 
  b.  Rump roast ought to cook slowly. (Cooking Advice) 
c. Americanized spelling ought to be eliminated. (Editorial Advice) 
Clearly these play a role much more like (12b) than (12a), in that they can be said in the 
context of giving advice. However, they cannot be assigned control syntax since their 
syntactic subjects do not conform to thematic-role restrictions. 
                                                
14 It is not obvious to me that the orthodoxy does entail this. If the argument places for the agent and action are 
at a lower syntactic position than the modal, then the modal could still operate semantically on a proposition that 
is determined, in such cases, by the values in the argument places for agent and action. It is worth noting in this 
regard that Kratzer [1991: 650] explicitly allows for different syntactic structures in modal sentences and tries to 
show how they are semantically predictable depending on the modal base she assigns to the relevant modal. As 
Hacquard [2010] shows, this argument is problematic, but, even within an orthodox model-theoretic semantics 
for modals like ‘ought’, we might still pursue an explanation of why different flavours of modality line up with 
different syntactic manifestations in particular languages like English. I pursue this idea more in §5. 
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Schroeder’s response will be that the ‘ought’s in (13) might be relevant for advice, 
but they are not directly relevant for advice. Recall (fn. 13 above) that a deliberative ‘ought’ 
is supposed to be directly relevant for advice in the sense that ‘knowing what someone ought 
to do, in the deliberative sense, settles the question of what is advisable for them to do’ 
[2011: 9fn]. However, if, for example, I’ve called my mother for advice about how to cook 
rump roast, and she asserts (13b), knowing it to be true, then surely this settles the question of 
what is advisable for me to do regarding the rump roast. At least, it seems to be as settled as 
when an assertion of (12b), known to be true, settles the question of what is advisable for 
Larry to do with his money. In order for Schroeder to use a distinction between direct and 
indirect relevance to advice to block such counterexamples, he needs to provide a non-
question-begging account of the difference, and I cannot see how he could do this. 
Admittedly, these examples are not clear-cut counterexamples. Although he won’t 
convince those who, like me, hear (12b) and (13b) in a very similar way, Schroeder could, 
perhaps, lean heavily on the distinction between something’s being directly or indirectly 
relevant for advice and then simply deny that the sentences in (13) represent cases of the 
deliberative sense of ‘ought’, as he is thinking of that category. But recall that he insists that 
there is a ‘very clearly a reading’ [ibid.: 14] of sentences like (11a) and (11b) on which they 
don’t admit of all of the same possible readings. This is because, as he writes, ‘…one of the 
important data about this example is that (11a) has a deliberative reading that is unavailable 
for (11b)’ [ibid., italics in the original, numbering altered). In my opinion, however, for that 
to be a datum with any theoretical weight, it also needs to be very clear that a deliberative 
reading is unavailable for sentences like those in (13). Yet a comparison with the sentences in 
(13) leads me to suspect that, insofar as there is a distinct category of ‘deliberative’ ‘ought’s, 
a deliberative reading of (11b) is probably possible even if it’s less natural than with (11a).  
Imagine, for instance, a context in which some actors Lucy, Tom and Bill are 
rehearsing a new piece, and Lucy (playing the heroine) is kissed by Tom (playing the hero). 
But this is wrong, so the director interrupts the rehearsal to explain the script. Then he says: 
‘Start again, but this time Lucy ought to be kissed by Bill – not Tom.’ To my ear, this sounds 
like direct advice, clearly relevant to the practical deliberations of the actors. This may not 
refute the idea that that a deliberative reading is unavailable for (11b), but examples like 
these do lead me to be sceptical that things break as clearly the other way as Schroeder 
argument requires. 
Now that the water is sufficiently muddy, let me try to clear it up by considering two 
further tests for control syntax. Above we encountered two linguistic tests for control: 
thematic-role restriction on the syntactic subject and active/passive non-synonymy. 
Schroeder discusses both of these. Here is third test he does not mention. In English, control 
verbs admit of er-nominalization but raising verbs do not. For example, from ‘tries’, we can 
get ‘trier’ as the person who tries; from ‘want’ we can get ‘wanter’ as the person who wants, 
etc. This contrasts with raising verbs. From ‘seems’ we cannot get ‘seemer’ as the person 
who seems; from ‘appears’ we cannot get ‘appearer’ as the person who appears, etc.15,16  
                                                
15 With some verbs it is not completely clear how to adjudicate this test. Do we get ‘continuer’ as the one who 
continues, ‘beginner’ as the one who begins? I think we do, but each of these verbs has been suggested as 
evoking both control and raising structures. So there may contexts where these verbs are used but no one fills 
the role denoted by the correlative -er nominalization. See Perlmutter [1970] and Fukuda [2007] for discussion 
of this test. Further difficult cases are the verbs ‘need’ and ‘dare’. Their syntax is complicated by the fact that 
they can function as modal auxiliaries or lexical verbs. 
16 It is worth mentioning that Perlmutter [1970] alludes to another test for control structure that I think ‘ought’ 
always fails. He claims that control verbs can be used in an imperative formation, while raising verbs cannot. 
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This is exactly what we should expect if raising verbs operate semantically on 
propositions; for many of the propositions that could seem or appear to be true will be ones 
where it doesn’t make sense to ask who is the person who seems or appears. By contrast, if 
control verbs relate a subject who must fill the thematic-role of an agent to some 
complement, it makes perfect sense that we could ask who is the person who tries/wants.  
Now, consider ‘ought’. From ‘ought’ can we get ‘oughter’ as the one who oughts? I 
don’t think so. But if that is right, and this test is probative, then Schroeder’s view is false. 
A fourth test for control verb structure derived from Wurmbrand [1999: 5-6] has to do 
with the fact that control verbs can be passivized in ways that raising verbs cannot. For 
example, both pairs of the following are admissible: 
 (14) a. Someone tried to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Kissing Lucy was tried by someone. 
 (15) a. Someone wanted to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Kissing Lucy was wanted by someone.17 
But the same does not hold of paradigmatic raising verbs: 
 (16) a. Someone seemed to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Kissing Lucy was seemed by someone. (?) 
 (17) a. Someone appeared to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Kissing Lucy was appeared by someone. (?) 
This is what we should expect if control verbs have an external argument place so that 
they can semantically relate a subject and some object, while raising verbs have no external 
argument place and so that they can semantically operate on a proposition. In the former case, 
we can make the object the subject of the sentence by passivization, but in the latter case, 
while we can passivize the statement of the proposition, we cannot passivize the 
propositional operator itself. 
Now, consider ‘ought’. Is anything like the following passive transformation 
admissible? 
 (18) a. Someone ought to kiss Lucy. 
  b. Kissing Lucy is/was oughted by someone. (?) 
Again, I don’t think so. But, again, if that is right, and this test is probative, then Schroeder’s 
view is false. 
So, unless there is some special account of ‘ought’s refusal of -er nominalization and 
these passive constructions,18 it looks like these tests tell against ever assigning ought-claims 
control syntax, even when they deploy what ethical theorists might like to think of as the 
special agential or ‘deliberative’ sense of ‘ought’. And because it is far from clear that there 
                                                
For example, one might think it makes sense to say ‘Try harder!’ but it does not make sense to say ‘Appear to 
kiss Lucy!’. But I am unsure whether this test is probative of the control/raising distinction. For I suspect it is 
cogent for the theatre director to use the raising verb ‘seem’ to say something like: ‘You don’t have to really do 
it, but at least seem to kiss Lucy!’. However, informants seem to have mixed opinions on this. 
17 For some control verbs, a preposition is needed to make the passive sentence, e.g. ‘Kissing Lucy was hoped 
for by someone’ and ‘Kissing Lucy was planned on by someone’. 
18 The strength of both of these tests may seem to be weakened by the fact that English modals like ‘ought’ are 
‘defective’ verbs in that they refuse tense and person morphology. Perhaps this, rather than ‘ought’s semantic 
function explains the lack of -er nominalization and passivisation. However, the semi-modal ‘has to’, which 
seems to be semantically very closely related to ‘ought to’ is nondefective and yet it too does not pass either test 
for control syntax. Moreover, German modal verbs are not defective in that they do take tense and person 
morphology (‘ought’ = sollen: pres. soll, sollst, soll, sollen, past sollte, solltest, sollte, sollten). And yet similar 
tests for German show German sollen to be a raising verb rather than a control verb. 
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are ought-claims passing the thematic-role restriction and active/passive non-synonymy tests 
for control, I think the balance of evidence is against Schroeder’s view. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Some Lessons 
 
In §3-4, I explained and argued against Schroeder’s view that we should think of the verb 
‘ought’ as having two different senses – deliberative and non-deliberative – distinguishable in 
terms of whether the word evokes control syntax or raising syntax. This is not, I would like to 
stress, because I think there is nothing of importance in the distinction between agential and 
non-agential ought-claims. On their most natural interpretation, sentences like those in (11): 
(11) a.  Bill ought to kiss Lucy 
  b. Lucy ought to be kissed by Bill 
certainly seems to differ in precisely the fact that the former says something about what 
someone ought to do, whereas the latter says only what ought to be the case and is neutral on 
who (if anyone) ought to do something. However, I’ve given what I take to be very strong 
reasons for doubting that this is due to two different senses of the word ‘ought’ manifested in 
the kind of syntactic structures they evoke. 
Why does this matter? Ethical theorists are interested in the meaning of ‘ought’ 
because it serves in the paradigmatic statement of general ethical principles and specific 
practical conclusions. Semantic theorists are interested in the meaning of ‘ought’ because 
ought-statements exhibit the puzzling diversity of flavours illustrated in §1. This diversity 
might lead ethical theorists to campaign against the use of ‘ought’ in ethics, urging perhaps 
the use of less ‘flavourful’ words such as ‘obligation’ and ‘duty’. However, I think this would 
be to miss a mutually beneficial opportunity for both ethical theory and semantic theory. 
(And there’s no hope anyway of changing the way ‘ought’ is used in ordinary speech about 
practical matters including ethics, so there would always remain a question of the connection 
between this usage and straightforwardly deontic notions like obligation and duty.) 
For all I’ve argued above, however, the diversity of ought-statements could still be the 
result of a frustrating sort of polysemy in the verb ‘ought’. Perhaps there are a lot of different 
uses of ‘ought’, which are closely enough related that there’s no clean distinction to be drawn 
between senses, but also different enough to make one doubt that we could ever articulate a 
unified semantic rule. I suspect many ethical theorists who are alive to debates in theoretical 
semantics assume or at least hope that such a polysemy view is correct. This is a more 
linguistically subtle descendant of the ambiguity view I mentioned in §1. And, if we accept it, 
then perhaps it’s fine to say that there’s an agential sense of ‘ought’ along with many others, 
and it’s only this one that is of central concern to ethical theory.  
If, instead, we continue to work within the orthodox view in theoretical semantics 
(viz. that ‘ought’ is a monosemous operator whose semantic contribution is typically 
underdetermined or in need of contextual augmentation to generate a definite content for 
ought-statements), then the discussion in ethical theory about the difference between agential 
and non-agential ought-statements generates a challenge to semantic theory that may have 
some payoffs in ethical theory as well. I want to conclude this paper with some programmatic 
comments meant to explain why I favour the monosemy approach over the polysemy 
approach. 
Here are two initial (and admittedly defeasible) reasons. First, defenders of polysemy 
owe us difficult explanations of how ‘ought’ came to have this diversity of meanings and 
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how language learners are able to master it as easily as they often do.19 Second, the verb 
‘ought’ appears to participate in a system of modal notions that is inter-linguistically and 
intra-linguistically robust; so commitment to complicated polysemy about ‘ought’ would 
seem to force commitment to complicated polysemy about other words in this system (e.g. 
‘must’, ‘may’, ‘has to’, ‘can’, etc.), which exacerbates the difficulties in the etymological and 
developmental explanations. 
Here is a more positive reason for favouring the monosemy approach: Obviously, the 
assumption of an underlying semantic unity puts more of a constraint on what ethical 
theorists can cogently say about the meaning of ‘ought’, but I think it also generates 
underappreciated theoretical opportunities. For instance, if we take the philosophical 
distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements to represent a desideratum on 
the pursuit of semantic unity in theoretical semantics, then it – along with other 
considerations – can guide the investigation of how diverse ought-sentences (and other modal 
sentences) get projected from some unified semantic core. For instance, on the kind of 
monosemy view popular in theoretical semantics, there remains significant room for debate 
and refinement about the way modal words operate.  
In characterizing the orthodox view above, I briefly alluded to different species of 
necessity that are standardly used to cash out the semantic contribution of ‘ought’ in various 
flavours. This is often explained in terms of whether it is, say, moral ideals, prudential 
maxims, efficacy to some end, satisfaction of preferences, etc., that is crucial to the way in 
which a prejacent proposition is claimed to be necessary. However, this could be made more 
precise or altered in interesting ways in order to mark the agential/non-agential distinction.  
For example, some moral ideals might themselves be thought of as agential (action-
norms), whereas others might be thought of as merely situational (state-norms). Hence, 
assuming that we’re in a context where it makes sense to interpret them as moral ought-
claims in the first place, this would allow us to distinguish interpretations of, e.g.: 
(12) a. Larry ought to win the lottery (as he has had the fate of Job recently). 
b. Larry ought to spend his money on food rather than lottery tickets. 
by glossing (12a) as alluding to what is necessary in light of certain moral state-norms, while 
glossing (12b) as alluding to what is necessary in light of different moral action-norms. 
Similarly, some prudential maxims might be thought of as agential (the maxim is not merely 
or even that some state of affairs be achieved but rather that some agent do something) while 
others might be thought of as merely situational (where all that matters is that some state of 
affairs is achieved, whether or not a particular agent’s agency is involved). Hence, assuming 
that we’re in a context where it makes sense to interpret them as prudential ought-claims in 
the first place, this would allow us to distinguish interpretations of, e.g.: 
(11) a.  Bill ought to kiss Lucy 
  b. Lucy ought to be kissed by Bill 
by glossing (11a) in terms of what is necessary in light of certain prudential maxims requiring 
Bill’s agency, while glossing (11b) in terms of what is necessary in light of other prudential 
maxims where all that matters is that some state of affairs is achieved. Not all of the flavours 
of ought-statements will admit of this more fine-grained distinction, but several seem to and 
it would be a way for the propositional operator interpretation of ‘ought’ to incorporate the 
agential/non-agential distinction, while retaining its value as a systematic account of the 
semantic contribution of ‘ought’ in each of a diversity of kinds of ought-sentences. 
                                                
19 For attempts, see especially Traugott [1989], Sweetser [1990: ch. 2], but see also Papafragou [2000] for 
critical discussion of the implications for the monosemy view. 
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A different but perhaps complimentary strategy compatible strategy for capturing the 
agential/non-agential distinction is to be more precise about the semantic object on which 
‘ought’ is thought to operate. My gloss of the orthodox view in §1 may have given the 
impression that there is a one-to-one correspondence between an ought-sentence and this 
object (e.g., that, for any sentence of the form ‘X ought to Y’, you just remove the ‘ought’ 
and then conjugate the infinitive verb properly to get a proposition which is the object on 
which ‘ought’ is thought to operate semantically). However, this appearance is superficial 
and there needn’t be a commitment to such one-to-one correspondence in the monosemy 
view.  
Because of this, it’s actually quite easy to generate many different possible 
interpretations of an ought-sentence, some of which implicate an agent while others don’t, 
depending on how we specify the semantic object on which ‘ought’ operates. For example, 
both (11a) and (11b) could be glossed – depending on context – as making implicit reference 
to any number of particular agents, as in ‘It ought to be the case that the director sees to it that 
Bill kisses Lucy’ or ‘It ought to be the case that Lucy’s relatives ensure that Bill kisses Lucy’, 
but it could also be glossed as taking no stand at all about which agent, if any, is relevant, as 
in ‘It ought to be the case that Lucy is kissed by Bill’. Indeed, although it’s orthodox to 
conceive of the semantic object on which ‘ought’ operates as a proposition, this too is not 
required for the monosemy view. For example, Castañeda [1975: ch. 2, ch. 7] argues for a 
basic duality between action-descriptions considered as propositions and action-descriptions 
considered practically (i.e. as the possible contents of intentions or prescriptions, which he 
argues are not propositions). Nevertheless, he too treats the verb ‘ought’ as a monosemous 
modal operator taking both propositional and non-propositional arguments. Whatever the 
object of the ‘ought’ is, it is interpreted as saying that this object is somehow necessary – e.g., 
necessarily true in light of what’s preferable, necessarily true for a person’s life to go best 
overall, or necessary to do in order to live up to the counsels of morality.  
Given this flexibility, there will be infinitely many possible interpretations of 
sentences like (11a/b); however, when made in context only a very small number of these 
will be candidate interpretations of what the speaker actually meant to convey.20 And my 
suggestion here is that the difference between agential and non-agential ought-statements 
might also be captured in whether semantic object on which ‘ought’ operates specifies an 
agent qua agent and one of her possible courses of action. 
I mention these strategies for capturing the agential/non-agential distinction within the 
monosemy view as examples; there may be other fruitful strategies. The important point is 
that they are strategies for refining a piece of semantic theory that are motivated by that 
intuitive distinction drawn from ethical theory. As such, I believe they represent an attractive 
sort of theoretical cross-pollination, where our semantic theory can be refined by attending to 
aspects of ethical theory. This is lost in the retreat to polysemy mentioned above. 
Importantly, the opportunity for theoretical cross-pollination extends the other 
direction as well. For example, I think the monosemy view can point towards new clues 
                                                
20 So, I demur at Schroeder’s [2011: 13] suggestion that the ‘agency-in-the-prejacent’ strategy overgenerates 
interpretations of ought-sentences. To be sure, it can be used to generate many interpretations of any ought-
sentence that are not at all plausible in the context in which the sentence is used. But this is true of any semantic 
view of any sentence, as long as the view posits unarticulated constituents. These views assume that ordinary 
speakers use various strategies to narrow down the number of plausible interpretations worth serious 
consideration. Schroeder also argues that the agency-in-the-prejacent strategy undergenerates interpretations of 
ought-sentences. However, this argument depends on the claim that there is ‘very clearly a reading’ of sentence 
(11a) on which it has a meaning ‘unavailable’ for (11b), which is a claim I criticized in §4 above. 
 15 
about the nature and structure of normative judgment. If ought-claims are a species of 
necessity-claims, then perhaps we should think about the psychological role of the judgments 
they express more like we think of the psychological role of other kinds of necessity 
judgments. Philosophers as diverse and influential as Hume, Kant, Frege, Wittgenstein, 
Ramsey, Quine and Sellars have suggested that necessity judgments play an importantly 
different role in our psychological economies from ordinary judgments of fact. This is not the 
place to enter into the controversy about whether they are right about this, but if they are, the 
monosemy view about the semantic contribution of ‘ought’ might help us to see how a 
parallel view is the right one to take about ought-judgments, which in turn might provide 
crucial traction in debates about apparent differences in the psychological role of these 
judgments and ordinary judgments of fact. 
Another example of possibly fruitful theoretical cross-pollination from semantic 
theory into ethical theory comes in metaethical debate about the existence, nature and 
epistemology of moral properties. Again, if ‘ought’ is a kind of modal operator, then perhaps 
we should think about the debate about what makes ought-claims true and how we know 
them to be true more like we think about the debate about what makes modal claims true and 
how we know them to be true. To be sure, that wouldn’t settle the debate – views like 
realism, fictionalism, expressivism and pragmatism are all just as much available in the 
modal domain as in the normative domain – however, it would provide a novel way to 
characterize and pursue them. 
All of these issues warrant much more discussion than is appropriate here. However, I 
wanted to mention them in order to explain why I think we shouldn’t let the implausibility of 
the original ambiguity view or the failure of Schroeder’s more linguistically sophisticated 
argument force us to embrace a retreat to polysemy about ‘ought’. I believe that by working 
across semantic and ethical theory a monosemy approach provides interesting opportunities 
for progress in both. 
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